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Introduction
Rubinstein’s ?1982? model predicts ?or describes? a unique outcome in an alter-
nating-offer bargaining model. The result, unfortunately, is heavily dependent on
the bargaining procedure. Multiple equilibria may be obtained by slight modifica-
tion of the procedure ; e.g., Fernandez and Glazer ?1991? and Muthoo ?1990?.
While these studies have contributed to bargaining theory by pointing out possi-
bilities of multiple equilibria, they are unsatisfactory theories of bargaining per se
for just that reason. In addition, some extreme allocations supported by such
equilibria are not plausible outcomes. We should, therefore, view these results
with skepticism.
In this paper we propose a way of restricting the set of multiple equilibria in
bargaining models for which many equilibria exist, using complexity considera-
tions as in Abreu and Rubinstein ?1988?, Piccione-Rubinstein ?1993?, and
Rubinstein ?1986?. We consider a machine game as in Abreu and Rubinstein
?1988? induced from a bargaining model with ratification, as in Muthoo ?1990?.
Complexity considerations can be incorporated into the machine game. We as-
sume that players are concerned not only with payoffs but also with the complex-
ity of strategies used in the machine game.
We use a Moore machine ?simply machine? to express a player’s concern
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about the complexity of his / her strategy. This machine has been introduced into
the analysis of repeated games in Neyman ?1985?, Rubinstein ?1986?, Abreu and
Rubinstein ?1988?, Piccione and Rubinstein ?1993? and many other papers. Al-
though it is applicable in any strategic situations, there have been few applica-
tions except in the analysis of repeated games. A few exceptions are Osborne
and Rubinstein ?1990?, Binmore et al. ?1998? and Chatterjee and Sabourian
?2000?. Osborne and Rubinstein ?1990? uses the language of machines to ex-
press players’ strategies for convenience, but complexity of strategies does not
enter the analysis. Binmore et al. ?1998? and Chatterjee and Sabourian ?2000?
use the automaton in the machine game of alternating-offer bargaining.
There are two types of machines. Rubinstein ?1986? and Abreu and
Rubinstein ?1988? use the “exact automaton”: its input consists only of the
opponent’s previous action in an infinitely repeated game. Kalai and Stanford
?1988? use the “full automaton”: its input consists not only of the opponent’s
previous action but also its own previous action. The latter corresponds more
closely to the game-theoretic concept of strategy. If we employ a sort of Nash
equilibrium ?which will be called automaton Nash equilibrium? as the equilib-
rium concept in the machine game, then either machine is appropriate. If, how-
ever, a sort of subgame perfect equilibrium ?which will be called automaton
subgame perfect equilibrium? is considered, the full automata are more appropri-
ate.
We will show that many of the equilibria of Muthoo’s model are eliminated by
slight complexity restrictions. In this sense these eliminated equilibria can be
considered as unstable with respect to complexity consideration. This is due to
different structures among the subgame perfect equilibria in Muthoo’s model.
Almost all subgame perfect equilibria in Muthoo’s bargaining model are formed
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from two-state strategies, and so are the automata that are induced by such
strategies. The reason for elimination of such strategies is that in the machine
game such automata have unused states on the equilibrium path, and hence can-
not be used in subgame perfect equilibria when there are complexity considera-
tions. That is, we can always find profitable deviations that use only one state on
the purported subgame perfect equilibrium path in the machine game. We will
show that only one-state machines are used in subgame perfect equilibrium of
the machine game, at least when a somewhat restricted class of strategies is per-
mitted, and only Muthoo’s stationary equilibria survive such restrictions. Note
that we do not assume that players use only stationary strategies a priori. The
stationarity results from equilibrium considerations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies a bargaining model with-
out commitments as in Muthoo ?1990? and a machine game induced by the bar-
gaining game. We will show first that some subgame-perfect equilibrium strate-
gies in the bargaining game are not equilibria in the induced machine game. We
will then characterize the general equilibrium structure of the machine game in
section 3. Only stationary strategies are shown to survive. The last section con-
cludes.
2 Bargaining Model and Machine Game
In this section a bargaining model and the corresponding machine game are de-
fined. Then Muthoo’s equilibrium structures will be examined.
2?1 Bargaining Model
We consider a bargaining model without commitment ?Muthoo ?1990??. Player
1 and player 2 bargain over an item of size 1. We consider augmented
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Rubinstein-style alternating-offer bargaining. Player 1 proposes an allocation of
the good at the beginning of period 0. Player 2 responds by accepting or rejecting
the offer. If player 2 rejects the offer , then the game goes to period 1. If
player 2 accepts the offer , then player 1 accepts or rejects the acceptance
of player 2. If player 1 accepts player 2’s acceptance , the game ends. If
player 1 rejects , then the game goes to period 1. In period 1 the roles of
the players are reversed. In even periods player 1 begins by offering and in odd
periods player 2 begins by offering. The bargaining continues until some offer is
accepted and that acceptance is accepted. A period is indexed by  . . . .
Within a period, there are at most three types of actions taken by players in se-
quence. Thus actual time is indexed by , where sub-period .
The players have instantaneous von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
over the sizes of their shares of the item. We assume that the players consume
the good immediately after agreement. The players’ payoffs from the split
are for player 1 and for player 2, whereis the period
when the players reach an agreement andis the players’ common dis-
count factor. Let this bargaining game be .
The set of choices available to a player in the game is denoted by 
	
		
	. We shall denote a history of outcomes in a pe-
riod by, and the set of all such possible histories of an even period by	and that
of an odd period by 	. A history of a period is a complete account of what hap-
pened in the bargaining in a given period.
Denote a partial history within a period by 
and the set of such partial histo-
ries by . Examples of 
could be the null ?empty? set , an offer , an
offer followed by an acceptance , and so on. If 
is the null history, the
period is just beginning and an offer has yet to be made.
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Denote the set of partial histories ?the information sets? for playerin any pe-
riod by. Thus it is’s turn to play after. Then, denote the set
of choices available to a player , given a partial description , by :
Let be the set of all possible histories of outcomes of periods. Also let
		
be the set of all possible finite histories of periods. Then a
strategy for player is a function ? where 
for any and for any partial history .
We need extra notation. 	is the payoff obtained by player on reaching
is the end-node which is reached when is played. Denote
the period at which the players reach agreement when they play  and  by
. is either finite or infinite depending on the strategy combina-
tion 
. Denote the subgame of the bargaining game after a history
by .
2?2 Machine Games
We construct a machine game induced from the above bargaining game . We
employ an automaton ?machine? of the type considered by Osborne and
Rubinstein ?1990? instead of a standard automaton as considered by Hopcroft
and Ullman ?1979?. In our machine an action is prescribed by an output function
which depends not only on the state but also on publicly known variables. The
publicly known variables include the identity of the player whose turn it is to
move, the type of action the player has to take, and ?possibly? the amount of an
offer. We distinguish the state variables from the publicly known variables. All
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















if it is player ’s turn to propose an allocation after 
if it is player ’s turn to decide 
or after 
if it is player ’s turn to decide 

or 
 after 
information available from the game tree is excluded from the state description.
That is, our automata need to know much more information about the game tree
than standard automata. Using an automaton of the type of Osborne and
Rubinstein ?1990? has advantages in clarifying the structure of the strategies in
the bargaining game . We will discuss this when a stationary machine is de-
fined.
The set of strategies is restricted to those strategies that can be played by a
finite automaton. Finite automata have been adopted extensively in analysis of
repeated games. To introduce finite automata that implement strategies in the
bargaining game, we consider the following machines.
Definition 1? The Machine is   , where
?is a finite set of states,
? is the initial state that belongs to ,
?? is the output function mapping states and partial histo-
ries before player ’s move within a period into the set of action,
 	 	and 	
?? is a transition function mapping the current states and
partial histories within a period into the set of states.
If the machine has only a single state, the output function must specify the
same action whenever the same partial histories that belong tohave occurred.
Thus in order to specify two different actions under the same 	, the ma-
chine needs at least two states. The transition function specifies how the ma-
chine changes its action. Notice that while the output function is active only
when the player using the automaton can move, the transition function is always
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active so that the machine can move to another state anytime.
???
For example, the equilibrium strategy in the Rubinstein model ?Rubinstein
?1982? can be played by the one-state machines in Table 1 :
Player 1’s machine is such that
???
?
?  for all ?
?????? ??????? ?????????
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? 


if  is such that player ? is the proposer
	 if  is such that player ? is a responder and




is proposed during 
 if  is such that player ? is a responder and

	


is proposed during 


??? Here we have not defined the machine rigorously in terms of its implementability
because our machines are assumed to have much more abilities to implement strategies
than the standard automata in Hopcroftand Ullman ?1979?. We have simply assumed
that the automaton can know enough information to determine actions. Our automata
are just convenient expressions for strategies. We will discuss this problem later.
??? Notice that there are no nodes where a player decides to whether or not retract
his /her offer in Rubinstein’s model.
Table 1 : Automation in Rubinstein Model
state 

demands


accepts 




proposes


accepts 



Similarly we can specify the machine  for player 2?
Once a machine is defined, we can construct the corresponding strategy in the
bargaining game  from the machine. 
and 	 is called the -strategy induced by the machine ,
where is the state of the machine after a history .
After the history , the prevailing state is determined by the transi-
tion function 
?	 . Denote such a -strategy induced by the ma-
chine by . The combination of machines induces the pure
strategy combination  in the bargaining game.
Given that 	
, let be the machine such that
	

That is,  and differ in only the initial states.
By a stationary machine we mean an essentially one-state automaton. An es-
sentially one-state machine is defined by 	
such that for each
		
, 
. If  has only one state,  is an es-
sentially one-state machine. Essentially one-state machines, however, may have
more than one state if the output functions specify the same actions for any
. We call an essentially one-state machine a stationary machine because
the-strategy induced by the essentially one-state machine is a stationary strat-
egy in the bargaining game no matter what strategy the opponent uses. For
example, the machine in Table 1 is a one-state machine that induces a stationary
strategy in Rubinstein’s bargaining model.
Define a bargaining machine game in the following way. Each player chooses
a machine from , where is the set of all finite automata in our sense. The
machines chosen by the players play the game for the players. Each machine
starts from its initial state. Each machine chooses an action whenever it can
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Then the machine’s state changes by the transition rule. Then each ma-
chine chooses an action given the new state. The machines stop only after the
machines’ joint play leads to an agreement. If they do not ever reach an agree-
ment, the machines do not stop.
???
Player’s payoffin the machine game is represented by the payoff
in the bargaining game, where is the strategy com-
bination induced by the combination of machines . Let 	be
the complexity of a machine . The complexity is measured by the number of
states in . Each player has a preference of  

whenever
?1? 

or ?2? 

and 		
.
Thus we assume that players have lexicographic preference over allocations of
the good and complexity of the machine ?see Rubinstein ?1986??.
We define two equilibrium concepts for machine games as follows.
Definition 2? ?Automaton Nash equilibrium ?ANE??. The pair of machines
is an automaton Nash equilibrium if there is no and 	
such
that
 
In our machine games induced from the bargaining game , there exists an
ANE.
Proposition 1? There exists an ANE in the machine game induced
?????? ??????? ?????????
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??? Notice that since the bargaining game is an extensive form game, each machine
may have to wait to choose an action until the rule of the game prescribe that it does so.
??? Thus the machines can know where they are on the game tree and can recognize
the role of each node.
from the bargaining game .
Proof. Consider the machines in Table 2. These machines constitute an ANE:
We first check player 1’s optimality. Suppose that  is fixed. If  is played,
then  generates a payoff for player 1 at period 0. Consider player 1’s
deviation. Firstly, suppose that players can choose machines with at most one
state. If demands , then the proposal is accepted. Player 1 gets ,
which is worse. Ifdemands, then the proposal is rejected. proposes
at period 1. If does not change the acceptance rule, player 1 gets at pe-
riod 1. If changes the acceptance rule, rejects . Player 1 gets at most
at period 2. If changes only the acceptance of acceptance rule ?rejects her
own offer?, player 1 gets  at period 1 or  at period 2. Thus any deviations
using a single state are not profitable. Similarly, we can check the optimality of
relative to single-state deviating machines.
Next consider deviations by machines with two states. Suppose that  is
fixed. Using any two-state machine, player 1 can get at most  at period 
when demands an amount of the good ?and accepts player 2’s ac-
ceptance?, orat period whenproposes an allocation of the good.
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Table 2 : ANE Machines
state 
demands 
 accepts 
accepts the acceptance 
proposes 
 accepts 
accepts the acceptance 
transitions Absorbing
Note : 	
. “Absorbing” means 	 for all 		
.
Thus we cannot find machines that generate more thanfor player 1. Therefore
the machinein Table 2 is a best response to the machinein Table 2. Simi-
larly, we can check the optimality ofrelative to two-state deviating machines.
The argument is similar for deviations by machines with more than two states.
?
There is so far no consideration of the dynamics of bargaining in the ANE of
the machine game. The following solution concept ?Neme and Quintas ?1995??
incorporates such dynamics.
Definition 3? ?Automaton subgame perfect equilibrium ?ASPE??. The pair of
machines is an automaton subgame perfect equilibrium if after every
history in the bargaining game , the pair of machines is an ANE in
the machine game where the machine game begins from the prevailing state.
That is,  is an automaton subgame perfect equilibrium if for all
	, there is no  such that






where 
is the state after in period .
Although the machines in Table 2 constitute an ANE, if	, then the
machines do not constitute an ASPE. There exist profitable deviations at some
subgames. For example, there is a profitable deviation by player 2 at time 02
after  demands an amount of the good  such that 



. Such an will be rejected if player 2 uses  in Table 2. But player
2 should accept such an offer because after the rejection, player 2 can get at
most the present value 

.
It might seem that if strategies constitute Nash equilibria or subgame perfect
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equilibria in the bargaining game , then the corresponding machines constitute
ANE or ASPE in the corresponding machine game. That, however, is not true.
As we will show in the next section, some machines that induce subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies in Muthoo’s ?1990? model are not even ANE in the corre-
sponding machine game.
We will study the following issues in subsequent sections.
?1? Do all the equilibrium strategies of Muthoo ?1990? survive with consid-
eration of complexity?
Muthoo ?1990? showed that all possible allocations can be supported as
subgame perfect equilibrium. Folk-theorem-like strategies are used to support
such equilibria. We will show that there are subgame perfect equilibrium paths
of that are not generated by any ANE ?or ASPE? machine pairs .
?2? What are the ANE and ASPE in Muthoo’s model ?
We will show that the Muthoo model is ?strategically? equivalent to the
Rubinstein model when complexity consideration are taken into account. That is,
both the Rubinstein model and the Muthoo model with complexity consideration
generate the same equilibrium outcomes using similar stationary strategies.
2?3 Equilibria in Muthoo’s Model
In this section we show that some equilibrium strategies in Muthoo’s model are
not ANE.
Muthoo showed that the ?induced? stationary strategies in Table 3 constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium in the bargaining game. This pair of machines
is an ANE because, given , player 1 cannot get a higher payoff than
, and adding a state just generates a cost of implementing the machine
without leading to a higher payoff than. Similarly there is no profitable
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deviation for player 2. Thus those stationary equilibrium strategies in the bar-
gaining game are represented by the ANE machines in the corresponding ma-
chine game.
Muthoo ?1990? also showed that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium
, where means that the players reach the agreement for
player 1’s share at period . Such equilibrium strategies have different structure
from the strategies expressed in Table 3. The equilibrium strategies that gener-
ate the extreme allocation specify two different actions at the same . Thus
from the definition of our output function, in order to express such an equilibrium
strategy by a machine, it needs at least two states. The pair of essentially two-
state machines that generate this subgame perfect equilibrium are
summarized in Table 4. Notice here we use four states to express the equilib-
rium strategies by the machines. But under states, and, the output func-
tions specify the same actions. Thus we call such machines essentially two-state
machines. All equilibrium strategies in Muthoo ?1990? except the strategies of
?????? ??????? ?????????
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Table 3 : Muthoo
state 
demands


 accepts 


accepts the acceptance 


proposes


 accepts 


accepts the acceptance 


Table 3 need more than one state to be expressed by machines because such
equilibrium strategies specify different actions at some same .
The initial states for both machines in Table 4 are . The state is reached
from when the following history occurs ?see Figure 1? : Player 2 has offered
?the state moves to ?, player 1 has accepted the offer ?the state
moves to ?, and then player 2 has rejected player 1’s acceptance. When the
above history occurs, the machine reaches absorbing state . Notice that in the
machine game both players have the same set of states, and in statethe output
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Table 4 :
state  state 
demands ?


 accepts  


accepts the acceptance  


proposes ?


 accepts  


accepts the acceptance  	



Note :  . The transitions occur as in Figure 1.
Figure 1 : Transition Diagram for the Muthoo High Machine


 


  

Note : ?means that?dose not occur.
functions are the same as in Table 3.
In the bargaining game,  is a subgame perfect equilibrium
for sufficiently high . Player 2, for instance, cannot find profitable deviations in
any subgames. Suppose that player 2 deviates to get a positive payoff, proposing
 . It seems that player 1 would accept such an offer and player 2 would
accept player 1’s acceptance. But after player 1 accepted such an offer, it is op-
timal for player 2 to reject player 1’s acceptance for sufficiently high discount fac-
tors because both players change the state toafter player 2’s rejection, and so
player 2 can get the present value which is higher than for
 and 	 .
Isan ANE? We claim thatis not even an ANE in the ma-
chine game, even though the strategies induced fromare subgame per-
fect equilibrium in the bargaining game. Notice that on the equilibrium path,
state is not used. Players using machines and in Table 4 reach agree-
ment at period 0. Letbe given. Of course, player 1 cannot get a higher payoff
than 1. Player 1, however, can eliminate statekeeping the same payoff of 1 be-
cause  is not used on the equilibrium path. By using the stationary machine
which is used under , player 1 can get the same payoff. Thus there is a profit-
able deviation for player 1 so that is not an ANE. We conclude that at
least thiscannot support
as the equilibrium outcome in
the machine game. At this point there may or may not exist other automata
 that achieve 
. No subgame perfect equilibria con-
structed by Muthoo, however, are ANE in the corresponding machine game ex-
cept the strategies induced by the stationary machines in Table 3. This is be-
cause all such eliminated strategies have unused states on the equilibrium path.
From the above example, it seems therefore that ANE requires that all states
?????? ??????? ?????????
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be used on the equilibrium path. If so, from the definition of ASPE, punishments
to prevent deviations must be executed with actions on the equilibrium path
when deviations occur, because all states of machines must be used.
3 Structure of Automata Equilibrium
In this section we characterize general properties of ANE and ASPE in the ma-
chine game induced from the bargaining game without commitment. Some re-
sults from the repeated game literature are applied to our model in the argu-
ments.
Lemma 1? If is an ANE of a machine game, then for every state of
the machine  there exists a partial history such that ,
where is the realized state after .
Proof. Otherwise, player can eliminate a state which is not used in equilibrium
keeping the same payoff. This is a contradiction to the fact that is an
ANE. ?
Lemma 1 shows that all states of equilibrium machines must be used on the
equilibrium path. From this lemma the multiple-state machines of Muthoo
?1990? are easily proved not to be ANE machines because only one state is used
on the equilibrium path by each of them.
Letbe fixed. We show that there existswith the same set of states and
transition function as, the induced strategy of which achieves the highest pay-
off in the bargaining game for against -strategy .
Lemma 2? For any , there exists that uses the same set of states,
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the same initial state, and the same transition function as  such that
 for any .
Proof. Remember that 	. Given a machine 

 , consider the -strategy  for player . In the bargaining
game , let 	 be such that
	argmax
	
So 	 is a best response for player to  . Then we have the his-
tory that results in the end point 		when 	 for
player and  for player are played. Consider a machine 

 . The machine  has the same set of states, initial state, and
transition function as . Therefore,  .  will be defined below.
We investigate if there exists  that can induce the best response 	
given . In order to show this, it is enough to find a-strategysuch
that generates the history that results in 		 ,
.
Step 1. First suppose thatuses only one state ?the initial state? on the path
leading to the end point		. When players reach agreement
at period 0 or 1, it is sure that there existswith	 because
does not change its actions on the path, and can simply specify actions that
lead to the agreement at period 0 or 1. Now if they reach agreement at period
, they will also reach agreement at period 
because  specifies the
same actions at period 
and . So when is given, it is enough for  to
use only one state to reach the end point 			 ,
. Such , however, may have the same number of states as ,
but uses only one on the path.
?????? ??????? ?????????
??
Step 2. Suppose thatuses two statesandon the path leading to the end
point , and the output function for
some . Suppose that state  is reached at time 	
and players reach agree-
ment under the new state.
???
Because  has the same set of states as , a pair
of machines can reach by some actions that can be specified by an
. That is, at the initial state ,  can specify actions that trigger a state
change, and then can choose any optimal actions under the new state. As in Step
1,may have more than two states, though it is enough for to use only two
states to reach the end point .
Step 3. Similarly we can show that if uses states under which specifies
different actions with some same  on the path leading to the end point
, the pair of machines can reach the end point
for some  that uses at least states. This process ends in finite times be-
cause  has only a finite number of states. Thus we can always find 
such that for any . ?
Lemma 3? For any ANE .
Proof. From Lemma 2, for any, we can findsuch thatand
 for any 	
. Thus in ANE, 
. Similarly, . Therefore . ?
Lemma 3 asserts that the number of states of equilibrium machines are the
same. That implies that the equilibrium machines have the same set of states be-
cause the characteristics of states of one machine do not affect those of states of
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??? If the two states and are used more than once on the path, we have to repeat
the following argument.
the other machine. Lemma 2 says that given any player’s machine, we can find
player ’s machine with the same set of states, the same initial state and the
same transition function as player ’s machine that can achieve the highest pay-
off. Although it is possible forwith fewer states than given to achieve the
highest payoff, the equilibrium machines have the same set of states from the
above argument. Thus equilibrium machines  and must use the same set
of states, the same initial state and the same transition function.
Proposition 2? Only stationary machines can be ANE in the machine game con-
structed from the bargaining model without commitment. The strategy pairs induced
by such stationary ASPE machine pairs generate the Rubinstein equilibrium out-
come.
Proof. Let be an ASPE. Suppose that both machines have essentially
two states under which the transition functions specify different actions : From
Lemma 3, we can letfor both. Both and also have the same
transition function. W.l.o.g., suppose . Because  is an equilibrium ma-
chine, both and should be used in the equilibrium from Lemma 1. Suppose
that the game reaches the end-point under.
???
We show that in this case we can
always find a profitable deviation.
Subgames after  occurs : Let be the equilibrium path of play.
Becauseis the last state on the equilibrium path, there exists some partial his-
torysuch that after, the state goes toand stays there. Denote
the time afterbe	
	. ASPE requires that after every history in the
?????? ??????? ?????????
??
??? The case where the game reaches the end-point under  is handled similarly.
subgame , the pair of machines be an ANE of the machine game
starting at . We will show that the machines in Table 5 must be part of any
ASPE machines.
If the machines in Table 5 play the game from the beginning of the period, that
is from, then previous offers underdo not enter the analysis in this subgame
and all responses are best. However, since we have supposed that there are es-
sentially two states, the machines in Table 5 may begin playing after some be-
havior under . If the state changes to after player ’s offer at time , then
the effective offer ?player ’s offer at time ? is not, in general, the same as
orbecause we have not yet specified the actions that occur
under . Thus we need to check the subgame perfectness of the machines in
Table 5 whatever happened under .
First, consider the subgame beginning with player 1’s offer. Let 	be
given. If player 1 follows	, the outcome is. This holds for
whatever the previous offer is under  because we are now considering the
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Table 5 : Machines 	and 	
state 
demands


	 accepts 


accepts the acceptance 


proposes


	 accepts 


accepts the acceptance 


subgames beginning with player 1’s offer. When player 1 deviates after
, then the outcome must be eitherwhereand
where , or disagreement. Thus player 1 cannot get
a higher payoff thanby any deviation so that player 1’s machine is the
best response to player 2’s machine in this subgame. Thus is the best
response to in this subgame.
Next consider the subgames beginning with player 2’s acceptance decision of
an offer, . Let be given. If player 2 follows , then
the outcome is or . Suppose that the outcome
is when the players use . If player 2 deviates
?that is, changes the criterion of either acceptance or rejection of player 1’s
offer?, the outcome must be either where 
where , or disagreement. Compare and ,
. From




 	 

 	

player 2’s machine is the best response to player 1’s machine in this subgame.
Next suppose that the outcome is. Thus, other-
wise player 2 would have accepted the offer at period. When player 2 deviates,
the outcome must be either or disagreement. Be-
cause

 

 	
 


 	
player 2’s machine is the best response. Noting that we do not have to consider
a deviation with more than one state, is the best response to in
this subgame.
?????? ??????? ?????????
??
Finally consider the subgames beginning from . Let  be given. If
player 1 follows  , the outcome is either or ,
. Suppose that the outcome is. If player 1 deviates ?that is,
changes the criterion of either acceptance or rejection of player 2’s acceptance of
player 1’s offer?, the outcome must be either where and
, or and . Thus there is no profitable deviation for
player 1. Next suppose that the outcome is . Then 
. When player 1 deviates, the outcome must be either ,
, or disagreement. Because

 
	 



	 

there is no profitable deviation. Thus player 1’s machine is the best response to
player 2’s machine in this subgame. Therefore  is the best response to
 . Replacing the role of player 1 by player 2 and repeating the above argu-
ment, we can show that  , is an ASPE under .
We have concluded that players use stationary machines fromon. Other in-
duced machines may be ASPE; that is, the machines may go back to off the
equilibrium path. Such machines, however, can be eliminated because the in-
duced stationary machines generate the same payoff.
Uniqueness : Next let us show that the equilibrium  is the
unique ASPE at the subgame beginning at. Consider the machines in Table 2,
where. The machines in Table 2 do not constitute an ASPE except for
because we can find profitable deviations as discussed earlier.
???
From the previous result, we already know that only stationary machines consti-
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??? Notice that this discussion is different from the proof of uniqueness for the
Rubinstein model, as in Shaked and Sutton ?1984?.
tute ANE in the subgame after occurs. Thus it is enough to pick out ASPE
machines from such stationary ANE machines. Thus only machines in Table 5
constitute ASPE under .
Whole game : Let us go back to the original problem. We have supposed that
the bargaining reaches an agreement under . Here we consider the simplest
case whereis used first, and thenwhere the machine game ends.
???
We claim
that ASPE requires that from the beginning of the bargaining game, players use
the machines in Table 5. Consider the optimality of . Suppose that the state
change occurs at period and is an even number. Thus player 1 is the first
mover at period. ?The case whereis an odd number is handled similarly.?We
check when ASPE machines should move to state. Remember that the pair of
ASPE machines uses the same transition function.
Case 1 ?see Figure 2? : Suppose that the transition function specifies that the
state moves to  just after player 1’s rejection of player 2’s acceptance. If the
machines are used, the split at period ?odd period? is




 
If, for instance, only player 1’s transition function is changed ?i.e., player 1
moves to after the first sub-period of period ?, then the split is either




 at period or later, or




 at period or later
By deviating, player 1 gets at most ?evaluated at period ?. Thus
?????? ??????? ?????????
??
??? If the states are used more than once on the equilibrium path, we have to repeat
the following argument.
the deviations are not profitable.
If, for instance, only player 1’s transition function is changed ?i.e., player 1
moves to before player 1’s action at time ?, then the split is either




 at period or




 at period if 



From the deviation, player 1 gets at least ?evaluated at period ?.
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Figure 2 : Case 1
time ?
time ?
???
???


???

?deviation?

?deviation?




  at 




  at if 


or




  at 




  or later




  or later
or
Thus the deviation is profitable. So the state change does not occur just after
player 1’s rejection of player 2’s acceptance.
Case 2 ?see Figure 3? : Suppose that the transition function specifies that the
state moves after player 2’s decision ?or ? at . If the machines are used,
the split is either




 at period or




 at period if 



If, for instance, only player 1’s transition function is changed ?i.e., player 1
moves to before player 2’s action at time ?, then the split is either




 at period or
?????? ??????? ?????????
??
Figure 3 : Case 2
time ? ???
???







  at if 


or




  at 
time ?




  at if 


or




  at 
?deviation?



 at period if 



Thus the deviation can be profitable. Therefore the state change does not occur
after player 2’s move at time .
Case 3 ?see Figure 4?: Suppose that the transition function specifies that the
state moves after player 1’s offer. If the machines are used, the split is either




 at period or




 at period if 



If, for instance, only player 1’s transition function is changed ?player 1 moves to
at but before player 1’s move at time ?, then the split is




 at period 
By the deviation, player 1 gets ?evaluated at period ?. Thus the de-
viation is profitable. Thus the state change does not occur just after player 1’s
move at time .
By backward induction, player 1 must choose at time 01 in possible
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Figure 4 : Case 3
time ?
???
???






  at if 


or




  at 
time ?
?deviation?
???
???




  at 
ASPE machines in Table 6. Both players move toafter player 1’s offer. Notice
that the transition function requires at least one input. Using ASPE, player 1, for
example, can eliminate the state by replacing it by . Thus there is no ASPE
with essentially two states.
We can extend the above results to the case of more than two states by de-
composing the game depending on the states. The analysis ends in finite time
because we have assumed finite automata. Thus with the ASPE solution con-
cept, the equilibrium machine induced from the bargaining game must use only
one state. The equilibrium utilities for players are then the same as Rubin-
stein’s. ?
4 Conclusion
Although there are many subgame perfect equilibria in Muthoo’s bargaining
?????? ??????? ?????????
??
Table 6 : Possible ASPE Machines
state  state 
demands 




 accepts ? 


accepts the acceptance ? 


proposes ?


 accepts ? 


accepts the acceptance ? 


transitions After player ? offers, go to  Absording
Note : “?” means any action.
model, they are not equivalent in terms of the structures of strategies. A station-
ary strategy is often assumed in game-theoretic analysis when there are many
equilibria or when it is very complicated to construct non-stationary strategies.
In general, such an assumption is discouraged. This is because this assumption
restricts players’ freedom to choose strategies. In our model, guaranteeing free-
dom to choose strategies, the ?induced? stationary equilibrium strategies arise
endogenously from the machine game. Equilibrium strategies in the bargaining
that are eliminated when complexity is taken account can be interpreted as un-
stable with respect to the specification of the players’ preferences.
There are some issues with which we have not been concerned here. First,
we also have multiple equilibrium in two-good bargaining. To support some
equilibria we need a large number of states when the number of goods increase
because a new state is needed for constructing subgame perfect equilibrium at
the subgame where only one good remains. However, by considering trade-offs
between achieving the highest payoff and minimizing the cost of implementation,
we could also eliminate some of these equilibria. Second, we did not discuss the
implementability of our machines. As proper machines, we need to specify what
machines can know and recognize during the play in detail. Binmore et al.
?1998? use proper machines to analyze bargaining models. There, however,
states are allocated for proposal states, acceptance states, and acceptance of ac-
ceptance states. If we use such machines, we need more states than here even
in the case of stationary machines.
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